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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created 
to further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the 
European University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items 
on the Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available 
to scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research 
projects on topics of current interest to the European Communities. Both 
as in-depth background studies and as policy analyses in their own right, 





















































































































































































The Role of the European Court of Justice 
in the Development of the European 
Community Environmental Policy*
Introductory remarks
The decisions of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘the Court’) 
have certainly had a significant impact on the development of environ­
mental policy in the European Community. The Court has consistently 
supported the view that the Community should have legislative 
competence in this domain, notwithstanding the fact that such a compe­
tence originally did not appear in the Treaty of Rome, the source of all 
Community powers. It might seem rather exceptional for a court to take 
such an activist stance. The European Court, however, is known for its 
judicial activism in other areas of Community policy as well. In the field 
of human rights, for instance, Community policy developed entirely on 
the basis of a judicial inference of powers not mentioned in the Treaty. 
Similarly, in the field of external relations, the case law of the Court has 
been decisive in determining the scope of Community powers.
The active role of the Court in interpreting Community law and 
promoting Community policies is generally recognised as a driving force 
behind the process of European integration. Although most authors 
have been appreciative of the Court’s attitude (Dauses 1985: 418; 
Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat 1989: 169 and authors cited there­
in), some have criticised it, arguing that the Court’s decisions trespass 
the boundary of judicial powers and run the risk of losing authority 
(especially Rasmussen 1986). In view of the outcome of the recent 
Danish referendum it is interesting to note that Rasmussen contended 
in 1986 that Danish judges were increasingly concerned with the pre­
dictable pro-integrationist outcome of the EC Court’s judgments (1986:
*
A revised version of this text will appear in J.D. Liefferink, P.D. Lowe and 




























































































360 ff). Rasmussen’s criticism in turn has been sharply contested 
(Cappelletti 1987; Weiler 1987).
The nature of the environmental issues addressed by the Court, has 
changed through time. Two phases can be distinguished, with a poten­
tial third phase looming in the distance. The first phase regards the 
period prior to 1987 when the Single European Act came into force 
giving environmental policy a legal basis in the Treaty of Rome (here­
inafter ‘the Treaty’). Until then, the Court’s role was largely confined 
to arguments about the legitimacy of Community environmental meas­
ures in view of the lack of attributed powers in the Treaty. The second 
phase concerns the situation that has arisen after the coming into force 
of the Single Act. The new provisions about environmental policy have 
created numerous legal uncertainties which the Court still has to 
resolve. A possible third phase would start if the Treaty on European 
Union adopted in Maastricht in February 1992 came into force intro­
ducing additional changes regarding environmental protection.
In this chapter the historical development of the Court’s environ­
mental case-law is discussed as well as some general aspects of the 
functioning of the Court. We will start out by looking at the different 
procedures before the Court (paragraph 2) and the Court’s judicial 
activism in the field of human rights and with respect to external re­
lations (paragraph 3). This short excursion serves to put the discussion 
of the Court’s case law concerning environmental issues in perspective. 
In paragraph 4 an overview is presented of the early case law of the 
Court specifically addressing the legitimacy of Community environ­
mental measures. The important changes that were introduced by the 
Single European Act are described in paragraph 5, followed by a 
discussion of the Danish bottle case and the Cassis de Dijon doctrine 
in paragraph 6. The last Court case we will discuss concerns the 
different decision making procedures to adopt environmental measures. 
Some comments are added about procedural changes proposed in the 
Treaty on European Union (paragraph 7). Paragraph 8 draws some con­
clusions and speculates about the future role of the Court in promoting 
European integration vis-à-vis European environmental policy.
Basically, the analysis in this chapter hinges upon the question to 
what extent the Court’s active support of environmental measures has 
been instrumental to the overall process of European integration rather 
than being driven by concern for the quality of the Community’s envi­
ronment policy. If we find that the Court’s decisions in this field show 
a consistent bias in favor of market integration, it is reasonable to 
assume that the same support will not be given to environmental 




























































































the Danish bottle case (see below) seems to indicate that the Court is 
aware of this potential conflict and is, moreover, willing to adjust a 
simple integrationist approach to the specific requirements of a common 
environmental policy.
2. The different Court procedures
The task of the European Court of Justice is to ensure the uniform 
interpretation and application of the Treaty. Proceedings in front of the 
Court are contentious or non-contentious. Contentious procedures can 
be initiated by a Community institution, by one of the Member States 
and, to a lesser degree, by private persons, i.e. individuals and legal 
persons. The non-contentious procedure is a matter of cooperation 
between the European Court of Justice and the national courts in the 
Member States.
2.1 The non-contentious Court procedure
One non-contentious procedure exists, the so-called preliminary ruling 
or preliminary judgment (Article 177 of the Treaty), in which the Court 
interprets a specific rule of Community law (Kapteyn and Verloren van 
Themaat 1989: 311ff; Hartley 1988: 64). National courts can ask for a 
preliminary ruling whenever they have to apply a Community rule; if 
deciding in last instance, national courts are required to do so. A pre­
liminary ruling is binding on the national court hearing the case and is 
intended to secure the uniform interpretation and application of 
Community law in all the Member States. No formal hierarchy exists, 
either between the European Court and national courts or between 
Community law and national law. The priority of Community law over 
national law stems from the fact that the transfer of certain powers 
from the Member States to the Community has created a new legal 
order in which sovereign national competences are restricted (Kapteyn 
and Verloren van Themaat 1989: Sbff).1 Thus, a preliminary judgment 
is recognized by the national legal order of each Member State as if it 
were issued by a national court (Articles 187 and 192 of the Treaty).
2.2 The contentious Court procedures
Contentious proceedings before the Court can be divided into four 
categories: proceedings between Member States, proceedings between 




























































































Member State and proceedings between private persons and Commu­
nity institutions (Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat 1989: 152ff). 
Other procedures exist that are of little relevance to our subject (see 
Articles 178-181 of the Treaty). A schematic overview of the different 
contentious proceedings is given in Figure 1.
Defendant
Plaintiff
Member State Commission Council
Member State Inter-State Infringement 
Procedure (Art. 170)
Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Commission Infringement Procedure 
(Art. 169)
Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Council Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
European
Parliament
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Private Parties Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Action for Annulment 
(Art. 173)
Action against Failure 
to Act (Art. 175)
Figure 1 Plaintiffs and Defendants before the European Court of Justice
All articles refer to the TYeaty of Rome.)
The Court procedure that is applied most frequently to environmental 
cases is the infringement procedure, initiated by the Commission against 
a Member State that fails to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty 
(Article 169 of the Treaty). An infringement procedure is brought be­
fore the Court after a mandatory round of consultation with the incrimi­
nated Member State. During the phase of consultation a Member State 
is given the opportunity to voluntarily adjust the alleged infraction. It is 
the discretionary power of the Commission to decide whether or not to 
file suit if a Member State persists in its non-compliance. The Court 




























































































an opinion of the Advocate-General. If a Member State is convicted, its 
punishment is mostly restricted to political embarrassment, since the 
executive enforcement powers of the Court and the Commission are 
very limited.
With respect to environmental measures, infringement procedures are 
typically directed at the failure of a Member State to adopt national 
legislation implementing EC Directives. In most cases, Directives must 
be implemented within two years after the date of their issuance, but 
sometimes another time period is indicated in the Directive. The num­
ber of infringement procedures in the area of environmental policy has 
recently increased dramatically: in 1990, 362 cases were pending (EC 
Commission DG X I1991). We must keep in mind, however, that the ef­
fect of a preliminary ruling, addressed to the judiciary of the Member 
State in question, although limited in scope, since it only affects the 
outcome of the instant case, might be more direct than the impact of an 
infringement procedure directed at the legislature. It often takes a 
Member State years to adjust its legislation to the changes required by 
a condemnation in an infringement procedure.
Member States can initiate infringement procedures in the so-called 
inter-State complaint (Article 170 Treaty). In that case the Commission 
gives a reasoned opinion about the case. Member States, however, are 
usually hesitant to file a complaint against other Member States: those 
who live in a glass house should not throw the first stone.
The other two procedures mentioned in Figure 1 are the action for 
annulment o f Community acts and the action against the failure to act in 
violation o f the Treaty. The first is a typical judicial review procedure in 
which the Court tests the legitimacy of decisions of the Council and the 
Commission (Article 173 Treaty) and annuls decisions that violate the 
Treaty (Article 174 Treaty). Although the Treaty does not mention deci­
sions of the European Parliament, the Court has accepted on several 
occasions to review decisions of the Parliament.2 Each Member State, 
the Council and the Commission can ask for the annulment of a 
Community act. Private parties have a limited right of action, confined 
to decisions with an individual character which directly affect them. The 
same restriction applies to private parties in the case of an action 
against a failure to act by Community organs (Article 175 Treaty). In 
the latter procedure, the European Parliament is granted an equal po­
sition as the Member States, the Council and the Commission; each of 
them can resort to the Court to ascertain the failure of the Council or 
the Commission to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and to adopt 




























































































The Court’s role in the field of environmental policy must be assessed 
against the background of its contribution to other Community policies. 
Indeed, a brief review of the origins of the Court’s judicial activism is 
indispensable to frame the role of the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
shaping of the Community’s environmental policy.
3.1 The Community’s human rights policy
The lacuna in the Treaty of Rome with respect to human rights 
protection has been the subject of much academic and political debate. 
The suggestion that the Community join the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) was given serious attention (Clapham 1991: 84 
ff) and the Commission formally proposed accession to the ECHR in 
1979 (Dauses 1985: 414). This proposal, however, failed and the Treaty 
was never amended on this point. Thus, the Court did not seem com­
petent to apply human rights.
After an initial period of ‘judicial reticence’ (Weiler 1986: 1114), the 
Court started its activism with respect to human rights protection in the 
late sixties. Beginning in 1969, a series of decisions were issued in which 
the progressively established its power to apply fundamental human 
rights notwithstanding the constitutional omission in the Treaty. In its 
first judgment, the Court decided that human rights were enshrined in 
the general principles of Community law which the Court has to apply 
(Case 29/69, Stauder v. City o f Ulm, ECR 1969). Respect for human 
rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected 
by the Court, and has to be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community (Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ECR, 1970). In protecting human rights, the Court, 
moreover, draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States as well as from the international treaties for the 
protection of human rights of which the Member States are signatories 
(Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, ECR 1974 and Case 44/79, Hauer v. 
Rheinland-Pfalz, ECR 1979).
The Court, in other words, applies human rights as if they were 
incorporated in the Treaty. The absence of a written bill of rights has 
been offset by the Court’s judicial activism creating additional guaran­
tees for the individual citizen (Weiler 1986:1117). The question whether 
this activism is driven by concern for human rights or by the interest of 
market integration recently surfaced again in two decisions reported by




























































































Clapham (1991: 48-49). Contrary to other legal systems, the Court does 
not grant human rights the sense of absoluteness normally associated 
with rules that enjoy the highest rank within the legal order. The Court 
stated explicitly that restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of 
fundamental rights ‘in the context of the common organization of the 
market’ (idem). Thus, we may conclude that the activist role of the 
Court in the field of human rights protection must be seen in the light 
of the Court’s continuous contribution to European integration.
3.2 The external relations competences of the Community
Clear Community competences regarding external relations exist only in 
the area of foreign commercial policy (Articles 110-116 of the Treaty). 
In most other fields, competences are derived from the general provi­
sions in the Treaty concerning the legal personality of the Community 
and its competence to conclude international agreements with third 
countries and international bodies (Articles 210, 228-231, 238). Besides 
the case-law of the Court, the process of European Political Coopera­
tion and the activities of the Commission have had a significant role in 
this development.4
The first important decision of the Court in the famous ERTA case 
(Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, ECR 1971), was to set aside the 
principle of enumerated powers, compétences d ’attribution, with respect 
to external relations, and to adopt the doctrine of implied powers 
(Hartley 1988: 156-165). Contrary to the prevailing doctrine and 
contrary to the opinion of the Advocate-General, the Court ruled that 
Community treaty making powers concerning transport were to be 
inferred from its internal powers in this field. The Court determined 
that the Community had the power to enter into external relations in 
all the fields for which it holds internal competence. No separation must 
be created, according to the Court, between the system of internal 
Community measures and external relations (ECR 1971: 274). The 
adoption of certain internal measures necessarily confers on the 
Community the authority to enter into international agreements relating 
to the subject matter governed by that measure, to the exclusion of 
concurrent powers on the part of the Member States (idem: 275, 276). 
Implied powers exist, in other words, for external relations with respect 
to all fields in which the Community has internal competences. This is 
referred to as the doctrine of parallel powers. The implied power 
doctrine was upheld in the Kramer case concerning agricultural policy 
(Joint cases 3,4 and 6/76, Comelis Kramer and others, ECR 1976). Here, 




























































































ocean fishing was derived from the power to adopt a common agricul­
tural policy and from an internal Council regulation on fisheries conser­
vation in the Member States (ECR 1976: 1309, 1310).
An issue that was not clarified in these decisions, was to what degree 
external competences could only be derived from the existence of a spe­
cific internal measure, or could also be based on a general competence 
to adopt internal measures in a certain field. This question was ad­
dressed in a subsequent case which the Court heard in 1976. In Opinion 
1/76 (Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland 
water vessels, ECR 1977), the Court stated that Treaty making powers 
do not necessarily depend on a prior internal measure but may flow 
from the general provision creating the internal competence if the 
participation of the Community in the international agreement ‘is nec­
essary for the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community’ 
(ECR 1977: 755).
The Court’s interpretation of the limited Treaty provisions concerning 
external relations has expanded the overall competences in this field 
considerably. In principle, the implied power doctrine applies equally to 
the Community’s foreign environmental policy that has recently become 
an increasingly important aspect of Community foreign affairs 
(Nollkaemper 1987). 4
4. The first environmental cases and the Single European Act
The beginning of the Community environmental policy can be traced 
back to 1972 when the Heads of State and government issued a 
statement at the Summit meeting in Paris, expressing the need for 
developing such a policy. In 1973, the Commission published its first 
Environmental Action Programme and issued proposals for several 
environmental Directives (Koppen 1988). Some Member States were 
slow in implementing the Community measures and by the end of the 
seventies the Commission had started infringement procedures against 
several countries. In the cases against Italy and Belgium that are 
discussed below, the Court addressed the issue of the legitimacy of 
environmental measures in the absence of an explicit reference in the 
Treaty. By interpreting the general provisions in the Treaty, the Court 
determined that environmental policy fell within the sphere of compe­
tence of the Community. In a preliminary ruling a few years later, the 
Court went even further by stating that environmental protection was 
one of the Community’s essential objectives. Considering the fact that 




























































































a bold statement, reminiscent of the Court’s judgments in the field of 
human rights and external relations.
4.1 Infringement procedures against Belgium and Italy
The Commission filed suit against Italy for not implementing a Council 
Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member States rela­
ting to detergents as well as a Directive on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels.5 The first provided for an 18 months implementation 
period, which expired on May 27, 1975, the second gave the Member 
States until August 26, 1976 to adopt the necessary internal measures. 
The Commission started the infringement procedures in May 1979 and 
the Court issued its judgments in March of the following year (Cases 91 
and 92/79, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1980, 1099 and 1115). Against the 
claim of the Commission that it had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
the Treaty, Italy stated that it would not raise the question whether the 
directives were ‘valid in the light of the fact that combating pollution 
was not one of the tasks entrusted to the Community by the Treaty’ 
(ECR 1980: 1103 and 1119). However, Italy did maintain that the mat­
ter lied ‘on the fringe’ of Community powers and that the contested 
measures were actually an international convention drawn up in the 
form of a directive (idem). The argument Italy was trying to make was 
weak. First of all, as was pointed out by the Advocate General, if Italy 
really wanted to challenge the validity of the Directives it should have 
brought an action for annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty (ECR 
1980: 1110-1111). Moreover, the Directives were not only adopted as 
part of the Programme of Action of the Community on the Environ­
ment but also under the General Programme for the elimination of 
technical barriers to trade adopted by the Council in 1969. The Court 
ruled that the Directives in question were both validly based on Article 
100 of the Treaty, which authorizes the Community to adopt all meas­
ures necessary to eliminate trade barriers resulting from disparities 
between provisions in the national legislation of the Member States. 
Article 100, in other words, was recognised as the legal basis for en­
vironmental measures which were adopted in order to harmonise na­
tional provisions. ‘If there is no harmonization of national provisions on 
the matter,’ according to the Court, ‘competition may be appreciably 
distorted’ (ECR 1980: 1106 and 1122). Thus, the legitimacy of 
Community environmental measures was recognised to the extent that 





























































































A few years later, in a series of six cases against Belgium, the Court 
broadened the legal basis of environmental directives by interpreting 
Article 235 of the Treaty which authorizes all Community action, not 
explicitly included in the Treaty, that proves to be ‘necessary to attain, 
in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objec­
tives of the Community’ (Cases 68-73/81, Commission v. Belgium, ECR 
1982: 153, 163, 169, 175, 183 and 189). The cases were similar to those 
against Italy. Belgium had failed to implement a number of environmen­
tal Directives and the Commission brought an action against it for 
failure to comply with its obligations under the Treaty.6 All six Direc­
tives were based on Articles 100 and 235 of the Treaty. The Court 
accepted this dual basis, repeating that environmental measures may on 
the one hand be required to ‘eliminate disparities between the laws of 
the Member States likely to have a direct effect upon the functioning 
of the Common Market’ (ECR 1982: 171) and, on the other hand, may 
be necessary ‘to achieve one of the aims of the Community in the 
sphere of protection of the environment and improvement of the quality 
of life’ (ECR 1982: 191). By adding the second phrase, the Court 
established environmental measures as one of the implied powers of the 
Community, similar to the case law regarding external relations 
competences (Hartley 1988: 104). As far as the relevant objectives of 
the Community are concerned, they were to be found in the Preamble 
and in Article 2 of the Treaty. Inter alia, such objectives include the 
constant improvement of the living and working conditions and an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living.
4.2 Preliminary judgments about the Directive on the disposal o f waste 
oils
The French association of waste oil incinerators, the Association de 
Défense des Brûleurs d ’Huiles Usagées (ADBHU), contested the validity 
of some provisions in the EC Directive of 16 June 1975 on the disposal 
of waste oils (OJ No L 194/23) in a national case before the Tribunal 
de Grande Instance de Créteil. Since the matter regarded the interpreta­
tion of Community law, the Tribunal asked the Court for a preliminary 
judgment (Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. l’Association de 
Défense des Brûleurs d ’Huiles Usagées, ECR 1985: 531). The question put 
before the Court was whether the Directive, by empowering Member 
States to create restrictive systems of waste-oil collection and treatment, 
violated the principles of freedom of trade, free movement of goods and 
freedom of competition (ECR 1985: 548). Articles 5 and 6 in particular, 




























































































the prior approval and licensing of disposal undertakings, were under 
scrutiny.
In an earlier judgment about the same Directive, the Court had ruled 
that the Directive did not authorize Member States to prohibit the ex­
port of waste oils to other Member States since this would constitute a 
barrier to intra-Community trade. France had adopted national legisla­
tion to implement the Directive which had this effect (Case 172/82, 
Fabricants raffineurs d ’huile degraissage v. ‘lnter-huiles’, ECR 1983: 555).
In its 1985 judgment, the Court refers to the earlier decision, adding 
that the legitimacy of the restrictions to the freedom of trade adopted 
by France on the basis of the Directive, has to be interpreted in view 
of its aim ‘to ensure that the disposal of waste oils is carried out in a 
way which avoids harm to the environment’ (ECR 1985: 549). ‘The prin­
ciple of freedom of trade,’ according to the Court, ‘is not to be viewed 
in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objec­
tives of general interest pursued by the Community [...]. The directive 
must be seen in the perspective of environmental protection, which is 
one o f the Community’s essential objectives’ (idem, italics added IJK). 
Restrictions posed by environmental measures may be justified, accord­
ing to the Court, as long as they are not discriminatory nor dis­
proportionate. The Court concluded that the Directive had not 
exceeded these limits (idem).
Two aspects of the judgment deserve particular attention. First of all, 
we observe that the Court digressed to state that environmental protec­
tion was one of the Community’s essential objectives. The phrase was 
added to strengthen the line of reasoning of the Court, but it was not 
indispensable. It was, moreover, not true. Environmental protection was 
not yet mentioned in the Treaty as a Community policy, let alone as a 
Community objective. Why then did the Court choose such a strong for­
mulation? Undoubtedly, the judgment had an impact at the time on the 
discussions that were being held about the proposed Treaty changes. 
The Court took a position in these discussions, by showing its support 
for the proposal to include environmental protection among the objec­
tives of the Community. This is indeed a typical instance of judicial 
activism of the Court. The Court ruled according to what it thought the 
law ought to be and not according to what the law was (Hartley 1988: 
77-78).
Having put environmental protection on equal footing with other 
Community objectives, the Court was then able to make a relative as­
sessment of the different interests at stake. It was the first time that the 
Court undertook to balance the interests of environmental protection 




























































































non-discrimination and proportionality. A few years later, the Court ap­
plied this method another time and developed it further (see the discus­
sion of the Danish bottle case, below). It must be kept in mind, how­
ever, that this was after environmental protection had been included in 
the Treaty. In 1985, the Court’s reasoning was certainly beyond the li­
mits of orthodox legal interpretation. With its activism, the Court made 
up for some of the political and legislative inertia of the Community, 
just as it had done in other policy areas (Rasmussen 1986: 416; Weiler 
1986: 1116-1117).
5. The amendments introduced by the Single European Act
With the coming into force of the Single European Act (SEA) on July 
1, 1987, environmental protection was included in the Treaty as one of 
the Community policies (Articles 130R, 130S and 130T). Environmental 
protection is mentioned as well in Article 100A, a provision inserted in 
the Treaty by the SEA, which authorizes the adoption of all harmoni­
zation measures necessary for the establishment of the Internal Market. 
Thus a dichotomy is created between environmental measures that are 
part of the Internal Market programme and action that is not related 
to the functioning of the Internal Market. The distinction has several 
important consequences.
First of all, Article 100A establishes that all harmonization measures 
adopted in the context of the Internal Market are adopted by qualified 
majority, whereas measures based on Article 130S require a unanimous 
vote in the Council. The difference in the voting procedure is further­
more reflected in a different role of the European Parliament. This 
particular aspect will be discussed separately, in the light of recent case 
law of the Court (paragraph 7).
Another difference that needs to be considered regards the margin 
of discretion of Member States to enact national legislation after the 
adoption of a Community measure. If a measure is adopted on the basis 
of Article 130S, this ‘shall not prevent Member States from maintaining 
or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this 
Treaty’ (Article 130T). Measures adopted on the basis of Article 100A, 
however, allow a Member State to apply a national provision after noti­
fying the Commission who must verify that the national provision is not 
‘a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between the Member States’ (Article 100A para 4). The difference in 
the wording of the two articles, ‘maintaining or introducing’ as opposed 




























































































on the basis of Article 100A, Member States can continue to apply al­
ready existing national provisions, to the extent that they have been 
approved by the Commission. In the case of measures based on Article 
130S, Member States are free to adopt new national legislation on the 
same topic as long as it contains more stringent standards. The require­
ment that the national provisions must be compatible with the Treaty 
means that they have to fulfil the same general requirements that apply 
to national environmental legislation in the absence of Community rules. 
Therefore, the choice of the legal basis of a proposed environmental 
measure has significant ramifications and it is one of the issues ad­
dressed by the Court in its case law after the SEA (see paragraph 7).
Among the principles that underlie Community environmental policy, 
enumerated in Article 130R, one deserves special attention. The 
integration principle requires that environmental considerations be an 
integral part of all other Community policies. This principle gives 
environmental policy a unique status in the Community since it is the 
only policy field for which such a requirement is explicitly formulated. 
Although many were sceptical at the time about the implementation of 
the new principle, five years later we must acknowledge that some 
results have been attained. Recent initiatives in the transport sector 
might serve as an example (Directorate General VII 1992). Moreover, 
the principle has served the Court as a guidance in interpreting other 
aspects of Community environmental law.
With respect to Community external relations in the field of environ­
mental protection the Single Act has created an ambiguous situation. 
Article 130R para 5 determines that the conclusion of international 
agreements by the Community ‘shall be without prejudice to Member 
States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements.’ The provision seems to imply that Community 
competence in this field never excludes concurrent powers on the part 
of the Member States. This interpretation, however, would be contrary 
to the general case-law of the Court on external relations. It would 
especially come into conflict with the Court’s decision in the ERTA 
case. A partial solution to the dilemma can be found in a Declaration 
that was added to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference 
where the SEA was adopted, which states that the provisions of Article 
130R para 5 ‘do not affect the principles resulting from the judgment 
handed down by the Court of Justice in the ERTA case.’ From this we 
can derive that the ERTA doctrine of implied external competence is 
applicable to environmental policy. A contrario, this would mean that 
the other relevant decisions of the Court in this matter, most notably 




























































































cy. External powers could then be legitimately based on an existing 
internal measure, excluding concurrent powers of the Member States. 
They could not, however, be deduced from the existence of the general 
competence to adopt internal measures concerning a certain subject 
matter. The Court of Justice has not yet had the occasion to clarify the 
situation. It is doubtful that the Court would limit itself to applying the 
ERTA doctrine to international environmental agreements without ref­
erence to the other aspects of the jurisprudence it developed about 
external relations competences. For the moment we can observe that in 
practice the Community assumes exclusive powers only concerning mat­
ters for which internal rules have been adopted. For all other issues the 
Community participates in international negotiations alongside the 
Member States. Most international environmental agreements are so- 
called mixed agreements, signed by the Community and by the Member 
States (Nollkaemper 1987: 70ff; Haigh 1991: 173).
6. Towards ‘diversified integration’: the freedom to be cleaner than 
the rest
The judgment of the Court in the Danish bottle case (Case 302/86, 
Commission v. Denmark, ECR 1988: 4627) is one in a series of decisions 
about the scope of admissible exceptions to the general prohibition of 
quantitative import restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect 
in the Community (Article 30 of the Treaty). The Treaty itself lists a 
number of acceptable reasons including public morality, public security, 
public health and the protection of national monuments (Article 36). 
Member States have extensively tried to exploit these categories of 
exceptions to try and convince the Court of the necessity to apply a 
national rule that created an obstacle to free trade. The argument of 
consumer protection for instance was used at a number of occasions, 
and the case law thus developed served as a precedent for the first 
decision about environmental protection as a legitimate exception.
6.1 French liqueur, Belgian margarine and German beer
The first relevant case law of the Court dates back to 1979, when the 
Court issued its decision in the case Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78, 
Rewe-Zentral AG  v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, ECR 
1979: 649). Germany had banned the import of the French liqueur 
Cassis de Dijon on the grounds that its alcohol content, 15 to 20 




























































































spirits contained in the Law on the Monopoly in Spirits of 1922, which 
required a minimum wine-spirit content of 32 percent. The Court 
observed dryly that the fixing of a minimum wine-spirits content for 
potable spirits could certainly not be justified by reasons related to 
human health, as the German government had maintained, and obliged 
Germany to adjust its national legislation in order to allow for the 
marketing of the French liqueur.
A similar decision was issued in 1982, when the Court ruled that 
Belgian legislation concerning the shape of the packaging of margarine 
constituted an obstacle to free trade unwarranted by the need to pro­
tect or inform the consumer (Case 261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke 
v. De Smedt PvbA, ECR 1982: 3961).
Two years later, the Commission brought an action against Germany 
for its restrictive legislation on the quality of imported beer. German 
legislation prohibited any additives in beer. The Commission observed 
that this resulted in limited imports of beer into Germany while favoring 
the export of German beer. The German government emphasized that 
its legislation, referred to as the Reinheitsgebot, the purity requirement, 
dating back to 1516, was a measure to protect public health, and was 
thus acceptable as a legitimate exemption from the prohibition of 
Article 30. The Commission maintained that this was merely a pretext, 
since additives were allowed in Germany in other products. In its 
judgment (Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1987, 1227), the 
Court repeated the arguments it had put forward in the two cases 
mentioned above, also referred to as the Cassis de Dijon formula:
In the absence of common rules relating to the marketing of the products con­
cerned, obstacles to free movement within the Community resulting from dispar­
ities between the national laws must be accepted in so far as such rules, 
applicable to domestic and to imported products without distinction, may be 
recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating 
inter alia to consumer protection. It is also necessary for such rules to be 
proportionate to the aim in view. If a Member State has a choice between vari­
ous measures to attain the same objective it should choose the means which least 
restricts the free movement of goods (ECR 1987: 1270).
It was with respect to the last requirement that the Court deemed the 
German legislation excessive. An absolute prohibition on additives was 
not necessary, according to the Court, since it was ‘contrary to the prin­
ciple of proportionality’ (idem: 1276).
Recapitulating, we can say that although the Court in principle 




























































































derogations to Article 30, it was reluctant to apply this argument in 
practice.
6.2 The Danish bottle case
In view of the Court’s restrictive application of consumer protection as 
a ground to justify quantitative import restrictions, the Commission must 
have been quite certain of its case when it filed suit against Denmark 
for the packaging requirements it had issued for beer and soft drinks. 
It was certainly a test case and the Commission made it clear that it was 
of great importance to establish ‘whether and to what extent the 
concern to protect the environment has precedence over the principle 
of a common market without frontiers since there is a risk that Member 
States may in future take refuge behind ecological arguments to avoid 
opening their markets to beer as they are required to do by the case-law 
of the Court’ (ECR 1988: 4611; Sands 1990: 696-697).
In Denmark, legislation had been enacted requiring that beer and soft 
drinks be marketed in re-usable containers approved by the National 
Agency for the Protection of the Environment. A limited number of 23 
containers had so far been admitted. The number was kept small since 
that was the only way to make sure that each container would be taken 
back by every retailer of beverages, irrespective of the place where the 
product had been purchased. This, in turn, greatly enhanced the effec­
tiveness of the mandatory system, ensuring a return rate of 99 percent, 
a figure that could never be reached with any other deposit-and-retum 
system. Beverages in non-approved containers were allowed up to a 
yearly quantity of 3000 hectoliters per producer, provided that a 
deposit-and-retum system was established by the producer. Non-ap­
proved containers would only be taken back by the retailer who sold the 
beverages. No form of metal container was allowed. The rationale 
behind the system, according to the Danish government, was to protect 
the environment and to conserve resources and energy as well as to 
reduce the amount of waste.
Allegedly, the Danish requirements made it very difficult to import 
beer and soft drinks into Denmark and the Commission questioned 
whether this trade barrier was justified on the grounds put forward by 
the defendant. The Commission did not question the general principle 
that environmental protection was one of the Community’s essential 
objectives and as such one of the mandatory requirements recognized by 
Community law that could justify certain import restrictions. The 
Commission questioned the sincerity of Denmark’s ecological concerns, 




























































































the case concerning beer additives, noting that the severe packaging 
requirements only applied to beer and soft drinks and not to other 
products like milk and wine which were not subject to competition 
between foreign and domestic producers. If Germany was not allowed 
to invoke its Reinheitsgebot to justify import restrictions on beer, than 
Denmark could not hide behind mandatory recycling requirements that 
had a similar effect. The Advocate General supported the Commission’s 
claim and expressed the opinion that the judgment of the Court had to 
be similar to the judgment in Case 178/84: the Danish requirements 
were disproportionate in view of their aim (ECR 1988: 4619-4626). But 
the Court took a more subtle stance. First of all, the Court referred to 
the Cassis de Dijon formula: obstacles to the free movement of goods 
within the Community must be accepted in so far as 1) no common 
rules relating to the marketing of the products in question exist, 2) the 
national rule in question applies equally to domestic and imported 
products and 3) the rule is necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements 
of Community law. The national rules must, moreover, be proportionate 
to the aim in view. Then the Court repeated its decision in Case 240/83: 
environmental protection is one of the Community’s essential objectives 
which may as such justify certain limitations of the principle of the free 
movement of goods. Thus the Court recognized that environmental pro­
tection is one of the mandatory requirements which may limit the appli­
cation of Article 30 of the Treaty and extended the Cassis de Dijon 
doctrine to include environmental protection. This was the first impor­
tant pronouncement in the case.
The Court then went on to interpret the proportionality of the 
Danish measures in view of the alleged aim of environmental protection. 
In full support of the Danish arguments, the Court stated simply that 
the establishment of an obligatory deposit-and-return system with a 
limited number of containers was indispensable to ensure the re-use of 
containers and therefore necessary to achieve the aim. Only one aspect 
of the rules was disproportionate, according to the Court, namely the 
fact that a maximum marketing quota of 3000 hectoliters was estab­
lished for beverages sold in non-approved containers in addition to the 
requirement that the producer set up a deposit-and-return system for 
the containers. This aspect of the Danish rules was considered in viola­
tion of Article 30 of the Treaty.
Determining where to draw the line between disproportionate and 
proportionate measures is hardly a matter of juridical interpretation. It 
is a subjective assessment of advantages and disadvantages and an allo­
cation of responsibilities. In this case, the Court tried to strike a balance 




























































































concern for environmental values. The decision shows that the Internal 
Market does not preclude differences between environmental standards 
in the Member States. From an environmental point of view this is an 
important achievement. The situation is still more complex if Communi­
ty measures on the same topic exist. In that case the freedom of the 
Member State to adopt divergent national standards depends on the 
legal basis that was chosen for the Community rule (see paragraph 5). 
This is one of the topics that will certainly be brought before the Court 
in the near future.
7. Different procedures to adopt environmental measures
As we have seen, since the coming into force of the SEA, two different 
procedures exist to adopt environmental measures. The Single Act 
introduced the so-called cooperation procedure which grants the 
Parliament the power to put forward amendments to proposed meas­
ures. This procedure applies to all measures related to the Internal 
Market that are adopted by the Council with qualified majority. Instead, 
if a measure is based on Article 130S, the Council must decide unani­
mously, after consultation of the Parliament. In the consultation 
procedure, the opinion of the Parliament does not have any binding 
effect. In both cases proposals must come from the Commission since 
in the legislative system of the Community the Commission has the 
exclusive right of initiative.
The ambiguous system thus created left a major question unanswered: 
how to determine when an environmental measure has to be adopted 
on the basis of Article 100A as part of the Internal Market programme 
and when a measure should be based on Article 130S. The Court ad­
dressed this question in a case in which the Commission, the Parliament 
and the Council disagreed about the legal basis of an environmental 
Directive. Before looking at the Court decision itself, we will briefly 
examine the role of the Parliament in the different procedures. A final 
paragraph is included in which the situation that will arise when the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union comes into force is described.
7.1 The role o f the European Parliament
The cooperation procedure introduced by the SEA enlarged the role of 
the Parliament in the Community legislative process. Although Par­
liament’s powers are still limited and the democratic content of 




























































































was achieved. The cooperation procedure basically adds a phase to the 
procedure followed in the case of consultation. When the Commission 
issues a proposal, the proposal is first sent to the Parliament for its 
opinion. The Commission is free to adjust the proposal to the changes 
suggested by the Parliament. The proposal and the EP’s opinion are 
then forwarded to the Council. If the procedure of Article 130 is fol­
lowed, the Council at this point takes a final decision and the proposal 
is adopted if the Council reaches unanimity. In the case of the coopera­
tion procedure, however, the Council adopts a common position about 
the proposal. The common position is returned to the Parliament. If the 
Parliament agrees with the common position, the Council can adopt the 
proposed action by qualified majority. If the Parliament rejects the 
common position, the Council can only adopt the action only by unani­
mity. If the Parliament proposes amendments, these are reviewed by the 
Commission who sends a revised proposal to the Council. At this stage 
the Council can adopt the second Commission proposal by qualified 
majority. If the Council wants to make any further changes these have 
to be adopted by unanimity. The main effect of the second phase is that 
the Parliament’s opinion, if endorsed by the Commission, can force the 
Council to decide unanimously which sometimes means that a decision 
gets actually blocked. Another effect of the enlarged procedure is that 
Parliament is kept better informed of the considerations and arguments 
of the Council. Communication between the institutions is, therefore, 
intensified.
7.2 Commission and Parliament v. Council: majority v. unanimity voting
A little more than a year after the coming into force of the SEA, the 
first dispute arose between the Council and the Commission about the 
different procedures envisaged to adopt environmental measures. In 
June 1991, the Court passed its first judgment about the issue (Case 
300/89, Commission v. Council, ECR 1991: 1-2867). The Commission, 
supported by the European Parliament, asked for the annulment of 
Directive 89/428/EEC of 21 June 1989 about the harmonisation of pro­
grammes to reduce waste from the titanium dioxide industry (OJ L No 
201/56). Contrary to the Commission’s proposal, the Directive had been 
adopted unanimously by the Council on the basis of Article 130S. The 
Commission had suggested Article 100A as the basis for the Directive 
since its principal objective, its centre o f gravity, according to the 
Commission, was to improve the conditions of competition in the 





























































































In its judgment the Court stressed that the legal basis of a proposed 
measure has to be chosen according to objective criteria like the aim 
and the content of the measure (ECR 1991: 1-2898). The aim and the 
content of the Directive under scrutiny, however, did not result in a 
clear answer since the Directive is as much related to environmental 
protection as it is related to the Internal Market (idem: 1-2898/2899). A 
dual legal basis was excluded by the Court arguing that the two Articles 
in question require different and incompatible decision-making pro­
cedures. If Articles 100A and 130S were to be applied simultaneously, 
this would force the Council to decide unanimously. This, in turn, would 
exclude the cooperation procedure and limit the role of the European 
Parliament. In that context the Court recalled the importance of the 
stronger role of the Parliament emphasizing that the cooperation pro­
cedure was added to the Treaty ‘to strengthen the participation of the 
European Parliament in the legislative process of the Community. [...] 
This participation is the reflection, at the Community level, of a 
fundamental democratic principle, by which the people participate in 
the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly’ (idem: 1-2900).
Besides the emphasis placed on the role of the European Parliament, 
three elements can be discerned in the Court’s decision to annul the 
Directive. First of all, the Court argued that the integration principle 
implies that measures to protect the environment do not always have to 
be adopted on the basis of Article 130S (idem: 1-2901). Secondly, the 
Court referred to its early judgments in the cases against Italy, to recall 
that the harmonisation of national environmental measures is often nec­
essary to prevent the distortion of competition. This type of harmonisa­
tion measures thus contributes to the establishment of the Internal 
Market and falls within the scope of Article 100A. Finally, the Court 
pointed to the fact that Article 100A itself requires that harmonisation 
measures concerning environmental protection take as a base a high 
level of protection. This provision is a guarantee, according to the 
Court, that environmental objectives can be effectively pursued on the 
basis of Article 100A.
The consequences of the decision are rather complex. From now on, 
most environmental measures are likely to be based on Article 100A, 
which makes environmental protection more closely related to the In­
ternal Market policy of the Community. This is a realistic solution in 
view of the fact that the two policy fields need to be integrated. The 
Court’s favorable attitude towards the cooperation procedure and the 
larger role played by European Parliament is positive in view of the 




























































































Majority voting will, moreover, facilitate decisions about issues that 
would otherwise be blocked by a veto (Dehousse 1992: 17). This last 
point is, however, also one of the potential dangers of the decision: 
Member States that object to a proposed measure because the level of 
protection it sets is not high enough will have difficulty to prevent its 
adoption, i.e. to form a blocking coalition. Once the measure is adopted, 
Member States are not allowed to adopt more stringent national 
standards, an option they have if a Community rule is adopted on the 
basis of Article 130S.7 Until now there is little reason to have much 
confidence in the requirement that proposed harmonisation measures 
take as a base a high level of protection. The conclusion, then, must be 
that the Court’s judgment was primarily inspired by considerations of 
integration; not the integration of environmental requirements into 
other Community policies, but the integration of the European market, 
a Community objective that continues to have priority over 
environmental protection.
7.3 I f  the Treaty on European Union comes into force
In the Treaty on European Union, major procedural amendments are 
proposed. The new Article 130S refers to three different kinds of 
decision-making procedures. The old procedure requiring a unanimous 
decision of the Council after consulting the Parliament remains appli­
cable only to measures concerning taxation, town and country planning 
and the energy supply of Member States. The cooperation procedure 
will apply to all other measures, with one exception. The Community’s 
general action programmes shall be adopted in accordance with the so- 
called co-decision procedure, a new procedure that is introduced for all 
decisions based on Article 100A related to the Internal Market.
In the co-decision procedure the role of the Parliament is further 
enlarged. If the Parliament rejects the Council’s common position, or if 
the Council does not want to adopt the amendments proposed by the 
Parliament, a conciliation committee is formed, composed of an equal 
number of representatives of the Council and the Parliament. If the 
Committee reaches a consensus, the proposal will be adopted, if the 
Committee does not reach a consensus, the proposal fails if the Par­
liament rejects the text by absolute majority. Hence, Parliament has 
been given veto power.
Another change introduced by the Treaty on European Union rel­
evant to our discussion is that environmental protection is recognized 
as a Community objective. An explicit reference to environmental pro­




























































































Community. The inclusion of environmental protection among the ob­
jectives of the Community, besides having a symbolic value, also 
strengthens the political status of environmental policy as compared to 
other Community policies, the Court is not likely to be much affected 
by this change. After all, the Court had already decided in 1985 that 
environmental protection was ‘one of the Community’s essential objec­
tives’ (ECR 1985: 549).
However, one area exists in which the change might have an impact, 
namely the external relations powers of the Community in the field of 
environmental protection. As was argued above, although in practice 
Community competence is generally defined on the basis of the ERTA- 
doctrine, the Court would be likely to apply other case-law as well, in 
particular the decision in which the Court held that external competen­
ces do not necessarily depend on an internal Community measure, but 
may flow from the general internal competence to act in a certain field 
(Opinion 1/76, ECR 1977: 755, see above). This interpretation is even 
more likely to hold true once the Treaty includes environmental protec­
tion as a Community objective, since the condition for the recognition 
of a Community external competence formulated in Opinion 1/76 was 
that the participation of the Community in the international agreement 
had to be ‘necessary for the attainment o f one o f the objectives of the 
Community’ (ECR 1977: 755).
8. Conclusions
It would be too simple to characterize the case-law of the European 
Court of Justice concerning Community environmental policy as merely 
pro-integrationist. The cases described above show a more complex pic­
ture, a line of reasoning in which a two-fold orientation can be dis­
cerned. Besides elements of traditional judicial activism in favor of 
market integration, we also notice an increasing concern for the protec­
tion of the environment in Europe.
A strong element of market integration was present in the first 
environmental cases (Cases 91 and 92/79, Commission v. Italy, ECR 
1980: 1099 and 1115) in which the Court recognised environmental 
measures to the extent that they harmonised national provisions which 
would otherwise create trade barriers and distort competition. Two 
years later, the Court slightly adjusted this reasoning by adding that 
environmental measures may also be necessary to achieve one of the 
aims of the Community (Cases 68-73/81, Commission v. Belgium, ECR: 




























































































the preliminary judgment issued in 1985 (Case 240/83, Procureur de la 
République v. l’Association de Défense des Brûleurs d’Huiles Usagées, ECR 
1985: 531), the Court started to challenge its own concern for market 
integration by first of all stating that environmental protection was in 
itself one of the Community’s essential objectives and secondly uphold­
ing the contested French measures even though they created obstacles 
to trade in the field of the treatment and disposal of used oils. The 
argument is a matter of simple deduction: environmental protection is 
a Community objective, Community objectives may pose limits to each 
other’s application, environmental protection may therefore pose limits 
to the application of other Community objectives. The same construc­
tion was applied again in the Danish bottle case with respect to intra- 
Community trade. The Court upheld Danish packaging requirements 
although they created in fact an obstacle to the import of beer and soft 
drinks into Denmark. The Court accepted the Danish argument that the 
requirements were justified by reasons of environmental protection and 
ruled that, as one of the Community’s essential objectives, environmen­
tal protection was one of the mandatory requirements of Community 
law which may limit the scope of the general prohibition of quantitative 
import restrictions of Article 30 of the Treaty.
It is beyond doubt that the objectives of market integration and 
environmental protection are at times hard to reconcile. In this respect 
it is important to note that the Court in its most recent case-law seems 
to have given priority to the imperative of market integration. Faced 
with the question which legal basis to choose for environmental 
measures, the Court insisted on linking environmental protection closely 
to the Internal Market programme (Case 300/89, Commission v. Council, 
ECR 1991). Although the Court stressed in its judgment that the provi­
sion contained in Article 100A paragraph 3, that all Commission propo­
sals must take as a base a high level of protection, should function as 
a guarantee, the fear remains that the harmonization measures adopted 
by the Community will force several Member States to lower their 
national standards.
Therefore, it seems to us that the best guarantee for a high level of 
environmental protection, is to grant Member States a certain amount 
of freedom to adopt more stringent national measures. This freedom 
already exists if a Community measure is adopted on the basis of Article 
130S. It is not clear, however, to what extent Article 100A allows a 
similar freedom.
So far, the Court has not passed any judgments about the extent to 
which national measures may diverge from Community rules. This is 




























































































future case-law. It will be a major challenge for the Court to strike the 
right balance between the traditional forces of market integration and 
the growing concern for environmental protection in Europe. If the 
Court decides to uphold its decisions in Case 300/89, it should decide 
subsequently to give a broad interpretation to the derogation clause 
contained in Article 100A, allowing the application of both new and 
already exisiting measures to the extent that they pass the test of 
proportionality. If, on the other hand, a restricted interpretation is given 
to Article 100A para 4, the Court will have to reconsider its decision in 
Case 300/89 and allow for more environmental measures to be based on 
Article 130S. Such a revirement in the jurisprudence of the Court is all 
the more needed when one realizes that the different realities existing 
in Member States require decentralised environmental action. Either 
way, the essence of the Court’s efforts, if it wants to continue to 
support the progressive development of environmental protection in 
Europe, must be to elaborate the doctrine of ‘diversified integration’, 
the basic tenets of which were set forth in the Danish bottle case.
Notes
1. The special features of Community law vis-à-vis national law were established by 
the Court in a series of cases, the most important of which are: Case 26/62, Van 
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, ECR 1963; Case 6/64, 
Costa v. ENEL, ECR 1964; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 
v. Simmenthal SpA, ECR 1978. Other relevant case law is cited in Kapteyn and 
Verloren van Themaat 1989: 38ff. See also Hartley 1988: 219ff.
2. The most important cases are: Case 230/81, Luxembourg v. European Parliament, 
ECR 1983; Case 108/83, Luxembourg v. European Parliament, ECR 1984; Case 
294/83, Parti Ecoligiste Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, ECR 1986; 34/86, Council 
v. European Parliament, ECR 1986.
3. The Parliament did so once, in a famous case regarding the (lack of a) 
Community transport policy: Case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council, ECR 
1985. For a detailed discussion of the position of the Parliament in both procedures, 
see Barnard 1987; Hartley 1988: 77-78, 374-375; Kapteyn and Verloren van 
Themaat 1989: 143-145, 281-290.
4. It is not possible here to analyze these complex processes in any detail; I refer 
to the overview article by Stein 1991 and the literature cited there for further 





























































































5. Council Directive No 73/404/EEC of 22 November 1973 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to detergents (Official Journal L No 
347/51) and Directive No 75/716/EEC of 24 November 1975 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the sulphur content of certain liquid 
fuels (Official Journal L No 307/22).
6. The following Directives had not been implemented: Directive No 75/439/EEC 
of 16 June 1975 on the disposal of waste oils (OJ L No 194/23); Directive No 
75/440/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the quality required of surface water 
intended for the abstraction of drinking water in the Member States (OJ L No 
194/26); Directive No 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (OJ L No 194/39); 
Directive No 76/160/EEC of 8 December 1975 concerning the quality of bathing 
water (OJ L No 31/1); Directive No 76/403/EEC of 6 April 1976 on the disposal of 
polychlorinated biphenyls and polychlorinated terphenyls (OJ L No 108/41); 
Directive No 78/176/EEC of 20 February 1978 on waste from the titanium dioxide 
industry (OJ L No 54/19). See the Opinion of the Advocate General (ECR 1982: 
159) and Koppen (1988) for a description of the cases.
7. The derogation clause of Article 100A para 4 has sofar not been used. It could 
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